THE FIRST U.S. WARSHIP SUNK ON 7 DECEMBER 1941: NEW JERSEY-BUILT BATTLESHIP, USS *OKLAHOMA* (BB 37)¹

By Captain Lawrence B. Brennan, U.S. Navy (Retired). Member, NJPHS

"Oklahoma failed to fire a single shot in anger during two world wars."

Captain Herbert Fox Rommel, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
Pearl Harbor Survivor of USS *Oklahoma*²

The first and last U.S. warships sunk in the Pacific during World War II were violently destroyed with the massive loss of life; both were built by New York Shipbuilding in Camden, New Jersey; both suffered fatal damage from multiple torpedoes; both capsized within 12 minutes. The battleship, USS *Oklahoma* (BB 37), was sunk at Pearl Harbor on the morning of Sunday, 7 December 1941, with the loss of 429 officers and men; suffering the second greatest number of casualties that morning. Together with USS *Arizona* (BB 39) more than 60% of the fatalities that morning were suffered by these two ships on Battleship Row. *Oklahoma* was struck on the port side by as many as nine aircraft-launched torpedoes.³

Nearly 44 months later, the heavy cruiser, USS *Indianapolis* (CA 35),⁴ was sunk when struck in the starboard bow and amidships by two torpedoes fired by the Imperial Japanese submarine *I-58* in the Philippine Sea on Monday, 30 July 1945, with the loss of approximately 880 officers and men. A further sad coincidence was that the last Commanding Officer *Indianapolis*, Captain McVay, the only naval officer court martialed and convicted for the loss of his ship in combat during either world war, was the son of Admiral Charles B. McVay, Jr., U.S. Navy,⁵ the World War I Commanding Officer of *Oklahoma* while she was deployed to European waters.

Today, USS *Missouri* (BB 63) is moored at the final berth occupied by *Oklahoma* astern of the sunken hull of *Arizona*. Both *Missouri* and *Arizona* were built at the New York Naval Shipyard in Brooklyn. Nearly forgotten on the opposite side of Ford Island is the sunken hull of USS *Utah* (AG 16 ex BB 31), a target ship which had been built as a battleship at New York Shipbuilding Company in Camden. Entombed within *Utah* are the remains of six officers and 58 men⁶ including the heroic Chief Watertender Peter Tomich, U.S. Navy who was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously for his selfless efforts in evacuating his shipmates from the boiler room as his ship capsized.⁷


This however is the story of Oklahoma.8

Oklahoma is one of three U.S. battleships sunk as the result of enemy action. The other two were USS Maine in 1898 and USS Arizona at Pearl; none were underway when lost. She is the only one which did not sustain a massive magazine explosion which caused the destruction of the hull and consequent large number of casualties. Maine reportedly was sunk by an external mine allegedly placed by Spanish agents in Havana in early 1898, although the proximate cause was in doubt. Admiral Rickover produced How the USS Maine was Destroyed (Washington DC: GPO 1976), written to support the conclusion that the loss of the ship was caused by heating and

ignition of the ship's coal in bunkers adjacent to the magazines. It is generally accepted that *Arizona* was lost as the result of a magazine detonation caused by a large bomb (probably a converted battleship shell) dropped by a Japanese bomber which penetrated the armored deck forward near turrets one and two. Despite suffering more combat "hits" than either *Maine* or *Arizona*, or both combined, the magazines of *Oklahoma* did not explode.

Beginnings:

Oklahoma was ordered on 4 March 1911 during the Taft Administration. She was the second of a pair of *Nevada*-class battleships, the U.S. Navy's first super-dreadnoughts and oilburning ships. *Oklahoma* was the only US warship ever named for the 46th state.⁹



Picture courtesy Wikipedia¹⁰


Fig. 1: Launch of Oklahoma on 23 March 1914 at the New York Shipbuilding Company at Camden, New Jersey.

As constructed, she had a standard displacement of 27,500 tons and a full-load displacement of 28,400 tons. She was 583 feet long, had a beam of 95 feet 6 inches, and a draft of 28 feet 6 inches. She was powered by 12 oil-fired Babcock and Wilcox boilers driving two dual-acting triple expansion reciprocating steam engines, with 24,800 indicated horsepower, resulting in a maximum speed of 20.5 knots. She had a designed range of 8,000 nautical miles at 10 knots.

As-built armor consisted of belt armor from 13.5 inches to eight inches. Deck armor was three inches with a second one and a half inch deck, and turret armor was 18 inches or 16 inches on the face, five inches on the top, ten inches on the sides, and nine inches at the rear. Armor on her barbettes was 13.5 inches. Her conning tower was protected by 16 inches of armor, with eight inches of armor on its overhead.

Her armament consisted of ten 14 inch guns, arranged in two triple and two twin mounts. As built, she also carried twenty-one 5 inch guns, primarily for defense against destroyers and torpedo boats. She also had multiple 21 inch torpedo tubes. Her crew initially consisted of 864 officers and men.

Oklahoma's keel was laid down on 26 October 1912. She was launched a year and a half later on 23 March 1914. The launch was preceded by an invocation—the first in half a century for a U.S. warship. On the night of 19 July 1915, a year plus after launching, large fires were discovered underneath the forward main turret, the third in a U.S. battleship in less than a month. The fire had been caused by "defective insulation" or a mistake made by a dockyard worker. This casualty delayed the battleship's completion so that she was not commissioned until 2 May 1916 at Philadelphia Navy Yard, with Captain Roger Welles, U.S. Navy¹¹ in command.




From Popular Mechanics Magazine, March 1916.

Fig. 2: Oklahoma under way during sea trials off the coast of Maine in 1916.

The First Years

Following commissioning, the ship remained on the East Coast. After the United States declared war on the German Empire in April 1917, Oklahoma was unable to join Battleship Division Nine, which had been sent to support the Grand Fleet in the North Sea, due to a lack of oil available in the United Kingdom. In 1917, she underwent an upgrade of her guns, including installation of anti-aircraft defense, and repositioning of her 5 inch guns. While berthing conditions were cramped, the sailors enjoyed multiple educational opportunities. They also spent their time on athletics, including boxing, wrestling and rowing meets with the crews of USS Texas (BB 35) and the New Jersey-built tug USS Ontario (AT 13). These competitions led to fleet-wide establishment of athletic teams by the 1930s.



censor markings.

Fig. 4: A September 8, 1917 Oklahoma cover with a Passed by Censor marking and a 3-bar cds (Locy Type 3(AC)) cancel.


World War I


Oklahoma enjoyed a relatively pacific war. On 13 August 1918, she was assigned to Battleship Division Six under Rear Admiral Thomas S. Rodgers, and departed for Europe with her sister ship, Nevada. On 23 August they rendezvoused with destroyers USS Balch (DD 50), USS Conyngham (DD 58), the New Jersey-built USS Downes (DD 45), USS Kimberly (DD 80), USS Allen (DD 66), and USS Sampson (DD 63), 275 nautical miles west of Ireland's west coast, before steaming for Berehaven Harbor, where they waited 18 days before *Utah* arrived. The division remained at anchor, tasked to protect American convoys sailing in the area, but was only underway once in 80 days. Just before the end of hostilities, on 14 October 1918, while under command of Captain McVay, she escorted troop ships into an English port, returning on 16 October. Then, the ship conducted her initial drills at anchor in nearby Bantry Bay where the crew played football and raced small craft. She suffered six casualties to the 1918 flu pandemic between 21 October and 2 November. Oklahoma remained off Berehaven until the end of the war on 11 November 1918. Shortly thereafter, several crewmen while ashore were involved in fights with members of Sinn Féin, forcing Captain McVay to apologize and compensate two town mayors.

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Oklahoma.





Navy Photo # NH 44401 13

Fig. 5: Admiral Charles B. McVay, Jr., Fig. 6: USS Oklahoma wearing experimental camouflage, circa 1917. U.S. Navy, WWI Commanding Officer of



Fig. 7: A 21 January 1918 Oklahoma cds Locy Type F (O7a) cancel rated R2 in the USCS Postmark Catalog and censor marking on a post card sent to upstate New York.

Convoying President Wilson and Between the Wars

Oklahoma sailed for Portland, England on 26 November 1918, and was joined there by Arizona on 30 November, Nevada on 4 December, and ultimately Battleship Division Nine. These ships served as a convoy escort for the former German liner, USS George Washington (TT 31081) carrying President Woodrow Wilson to peace negotiations in France following WWI. She then spent early 1919 conducting winter battle drills off the coast of Cuba, and on 15 June 1919, she returned to Brest, escorting Wilson on his second trip, and returned to New York on 8 July. A part of the Atlantic Fleet for the next two years, Oklahoma was overhauled, and early in 1921, she proceeded to the west coast of South America for combined exercises with the Pacific Fleet, before returning later that year for the Peruvian Centennial.




Illustration courtesy the online Naval Coastal Museum¹⁴

Fig. 8: Early (3 January 1921) cover with Locy Type1u 4-bar cancel rated R1 in the USCS Postmark Catalog.

Oklahoma then joined the Pacific Fleet and participated in a training cruise. The largest collection of U.S. battleships since the Great White Fleet departed San Francisco on 15 April 1925 and arrived in Hawaii on 27 April, where they conducted war games. The fleet then departed for Samoa, visiting Australia and New Zealand before returning home. In early 1927, she transited the Panama Canal and joined the Scouting Fleet. In November 1927, Oklahoma entered Philadelphia Navy Yard for an extensive overhaul: the addition of eight 5 inch guns; an aircraft catapult was installed atop of one of the after turrets; she was substantially up-armored with anti-torpedo bulges and an additional two inches of steel on her armor deck. Her beam was expanded to 108 feet, the widest in the U.S. Navy and just within the width of the Panama Canal.



Fig. 9: A registered strike, Locy Type 9v dated 30 November 1926 from an Oklahoma penalty envelope, and a Locy Type 5s 3-bar cds cover with a postmark dated 1 August 1927.



Fig. 10: A 1934 Christmas cover addressed to Herbert Rommel, Jr. from his father (see page 3).

Oklahoma returned to the West Coast in June 1930 for fleet operations through spring 1936. That summer, she carried midshipmen on a European training cruise. The cruise was interrupted with the outbreak of civil war in Spain, as Oklahoma steamed to Bilbao, Spain arriving on 24 July 1936 to rescue American citizens and refugees whom she carried to Gibraltar and French ports. She returned to Norfolk on 11 September, and departed for the West Coast.



Fig. 11: Covers relating to the 1936 training cruise with Locy Type 3(AC-BTT) cancels showing various ports.

Fig. 12: While on her 1936 training cruise, Oklahoma was tapped to rescue Americans caught in Spain at the outbreak of the civil war there. Locy Type 3(AC-BTT). Note slogan "Aids Refugees/Bilbao Spain."

Oklahoma was based at Pearl Harbor from 29 December 1937; only twice did she return to the mainland, once to have anti-aircraft guns and armor added to her superstructure at Puget Sound Navy Yard in February 1941 and once to have armor replaced at San Pedro in mid-August 1941. On 23 August, after encountering rough seas, she had to deviate to San Francisco, the closest navy yard with an adequate dry-dock, where she remained until mid-October.

REFUGEES RESCUED

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Fig. 13: A Navy Day cover for a NROTC cruise, while stationed at Honolulu, T.H. (Hawaiian Territories). Locy Type 3(AC-BTT).

Fig. 14: Idling the time away in Hawaii; May Lutha produced this nice hand-drawn cover showing a Locy Type 9 2-ring cancel from 1939. It is addressed to Lottie Eshliman, a well-known cachet artist in her own right.

Pearl Harbor

The Imperial Japanese Navy's strike plan for the Pearl Harbor operation was largely influenced by the Royal Navy's strike from a single carrier, HMS *Illustrious* (R 87), on the Italian battle fleet at the Battle of Taranto using aerial torpedoes despite the shallow depth of the water. According to Admiral Cunningham, "Taranto, and the night of November 11–12, 1940, should be remembered for ever as having shown once and for all that in the Fleet Air Arm the Navy has its most devastating weapon." 15

Figure 15 below is an aerial view of "Battleship Row" moorings at Pearl Harbor on the southern side of Ford Island, 10 December 1941, showing damage from the Japanese raid three days earlier. In upper left is the sunken USS California (BB 44), with smaller vessels clustered around her. Diagonally, from left center to lower right are: USS Maryland (BB 46), lightly damaged, with the capsized USS Oklahoma (BB 37) outboard. A barge is alongside Oklahoma, supporting rescue efforts. USS Tennessee (BB 43), lightly damaged, with the sunken USS West Virginia (BB 48) outboard. USS Arizona (BB 39), sunk, with her hull shattered by the explosion of the magazines below the two forward turrets. Note dark oil streaks on the harbor surface, originating from the sunken battleships. 16



Navy photograph 80-G-387565

Fig. 15: Aerial view of "Battleship Row" moorings at Pearl Harbor on the southern side of Ford Island, 10 December 1941.


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On Friday, 5 December 1941, *Oklahoma* returned to Pearl Harbor; it was her last day underway. Then, on Sunday, 7 December 1941, the first of four waves of the Japanese air strikes commenced more than an hour after USS *Ward* (DD 139)¹⁷ reported that she had attacked a Japanese midget submarine after searching for two hours near the harbor entrance.¹⁸ *Oklahoma*, moored outboard of USS *Maryland* (BB 46), was fatally wounded during the first of four waves of air attacks that morning. While the crew was ordered below for protection from the attack and to their battle stations, many of the men were trapped when *Oklahoma* capsized.

Fig. 16: Radio alert issued Dec. 7, 1941

- THIS IS NO DRILL"! All Army,
Navy, and Marine personnel to report
to duty." 19

Original U. NAVAL AIR STATION, KODIAN LASKA NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS		
Heading	NFG NR 63 F L Z #5L 071830	CBQ TART 0 BT
From:	CINCPAC	Date 7 DEC 41
To:	ALL SHIPS PRESENT AT HAWAIIN AREA.	
Info:	-UKGENT-	
DEFERE	RED unless otherwise checked ROUTINE Pi	RIORITY AIRMAIL
DEFERE	RED unless otherwise checked ROUTINE	RIORITY AIRMAIL
	AIREAID ON REARCHARBOR X THIS	IS NO DRILL



US Navy photo, courtesy of NavSource Online²⁰

Fig. 17: This drawing shows the damage to USS Oklahoma caused by the Japanese torpedoes. It also shows Oklahoma capsizing, and how she came to rest in the muddy bottom of Pearl Harbor. Each black arrow represents a torpedo hitting the ship. ²¹



Fig. 18: A cover from Oklahoma, two days before the attack, with notation at upper left noting the sinking on 7 December. Oklahoma returned to Pearl Harbor for the last time on the afternoon of the 5th. Because the cover was addressed to a recipient in Hawaii it appears to have escaped censorship or perhaps it was delivered on Saturday, 6 December 1941.

Capt. Lawrence B. Brennan, (Ret.) ~ FIRST WARSHIP SUNK 7 DEC 1941: USS OKLAHOMA

Oklahoma's Commanding Officer, Captain Howard D. Bode, had departed the ship just before the attack began and stayed on board Maryland. Oklahoma was sunk by at least six torpedoes and multiple bombs. She capsized within 12 minutes as a result of lack of watertight integrity following the torpedo hits on her port side. Oklahoma's bilge inspection covers had been removed for a scheduled routine inspection the following day (8 December 1941). This precluded counter flooding to prevent capsizing.²² Her crew abandoned ship but many of the men remained in the fight, clambering aboard Maryland.



Fig. 19: A photo of Captain Howard D. Bode, U.S. Navy. Bode was Commanding Officer of Oklahoma for only a month.²³



Fig. 20: The capsized Oklahoma.²⁴



Fig. 21: A hand-drawn-colored post-battle Japanese damage assessment map of the Pearl Harbor attack (80 cm x 60 cm) was prepared by Mitsuo Fuchida, lead pilot of the attack, and is inscribed with the warning: "Top Secret." According to Fuchida's memoirs, the chart was used for his briefing of Emperor Hirohito on 26 December 1941. Fuchida sent the radio signal "Tora! Tora! Tora!"

Illustration from the *Japan Times*, showing a map which fetched \$435,000 in a Christie's Auction in 2013. ²⁵

USS Oklahoma - Reports by Survivors of Pearl Harbor Attack

(These oral reports from that day, which bring this story alive, are from the Naval History and Heritage Command.)²⁶

Commanding Officer, USS Oklahoma, Captain Howard D. Bode reported that the:

- 1. [S]equence of events of the attack of Japanese planes on the U.S.S. Oklahoma and other naval units in Pearl Harbor ... [began] about 0750, December 7, 1941: The first indication of the attack was the explosion of bombs dropped at a low altitude (100-150 ft.) on the southwest hangar of Ford Island. Almost simultaneously therewith the ship was struck within a few minutes by three torpedoes on the port side at frames 25, 35-40 and 115. Those torpedoes were definitely seen approaching. The ship began to list to port immediately after the first hit. It heeled to angle of 45 degrees after the third hit. Two or three additional torpedo hits were felt. Great quantities of oil and water which covered the major portions of the weather decks were forced up by the explosions. The ship continued to heel rapidly and turned over through an angle of about 135 degrees in about eight to ten minutes. [Emphasis added.]
- 2. With the first warning of the attack the call was sounded to man the anti-aircraft battery and immediately thereafter the ship went to general quarters. Although the anti-aircraft battery was manned within a few minutes after the call and the ready ammunition boxes were being opened, because of the rapid heeling of the ship and the oil and water on the decks, it was impossible effectively to service the guns....²⁷

The following are excerpts from reports by three naval officers, a Marine officer, a chief petty officer, and a first class petty officer. Different men had different and conflicting views of the tragic events which were compressed in time and compounded by the violence and trauma of the Sunday morning unexpected attack.

Ensign H. F. Rommel wrote:

The first bombs were from dive-bombers on the hangars at Ford Island. Then a torpedo plane, coming in from over Ford Island, dropped a torpedo at a ship at 10-10 dock. The ship was hit about midships and the explosion seemed upward with many splinters.

I ran aft and passed the word "A cruiser has just been sunk. These are real bombs and real torpedoes. Man the anti-aircraft battery."

The ship listed slowly but steadily. No word was received over the speaker to abandon ship. I escaped via the overhang hatch and was picked up by a battleship motor launch. We continued pulling men out of the water...[Emphasis added.]

Pay Clerk D. L. Westfall wrote:

The word was passed "Away Fire and Rescue Party;" just as I was leaving my room the second word was passed for all hands to man their General Quarters Stations closely followed by a shock of a hit...time was a few minutes before 8:00 A.M.

I started for my station in Radio Central; as I was passing along the third deck up a port ammunition passageway, I felt two more hits. The lights went out in the passageway except for one battle light and two panel lights in the boat crane machinery space.

By the time I reached the compartment abreast the armory **the ship had picked up a 10-15 list to port**; there were a couple of battle lights on in this compartment. Water and oil were bubbling up

NJPH 14 Vol. 44/No. 1 Feb 2016 Whole No. 201 along the junction of the bulkhead and deck of the electrical work shop, port side. Repair personnel were busy closing watertight doors. ...

Radio equipment apparently was out of commission ... About this time **the word came along from man to man to "Abandon Ship"**... after some minutes, Ensign McClelland, who was beside me in the line, said he was feeling faint and then collapsed. I noticed other men dropping around me. I stooped over to pick up Mr. McClelland but when I stooped over I got dizzy and fell. I seemed to be paralyzed from the waist down, had great difficulty breathing, but had enough strength in my arms to drag myself to the ladder and up a couple of steps before collapsing completely...

The action of everyone I observed was cool and purposeful as soon as they fully realized we were actually under attack. The only confusion was occasioned by lack of lighting. My life itself is proof of the courage and disregard of personal danger on the part of unknown shipmates. [Emphasis added.]

Second Lieutenant William G. Muller, Jr., wrote:

I had just returned aboard ship on the 0745 motor boat; the boat came alongside the gangway at approximately 0750. On reaching the Junior Officers' mess the word came over the loud speaker system, "Air attack, all unengaged personnel seek cover, these are real Japanese bombers." I could hardly believe that this was a real attack but the excitement and reality of the voice convinced me to move. I left the mess and started aft, first stopping off at my room to get my pistol. My room is on the starboard side, just aft of the Junior Officers mess. I left my room and went over to the port side to enter the third deck. I finally found an opening in the line and started down the ladder. I had just reached the third deck and was almost opposite the ladder when the first torpedo hit. The explosion came from the vicinity of the Wardroom and was not a violent one. The line was still moving down into the third deck and I was opposite the Communication office when the second torpedo hit. This explosion caused violent repercussions and the whole ship seemed to tremble. I figured the hit was almost adjacent to where I was standing.

By this time I decided to leave as water was beginning to flood into the third deck and the ship started listing to port. I assume there were a couple hundred personnel in that third deck and only a few of us were able to reach a hatchway in time. Two more torpedo hits were sustained by the time I was able to work my way back to the hatch I had entered and to get up to the second deck. The ship was about 35 to port by this time and the decks were too slippery and steep to walk on. I worked my way to starboard by use of dogs and fittings on the bulkhead. During this time I heard the last two explosions which were somewhere amidship or aft. There were six torpedo hits that I heard in all.

With difficulty I made the starboard side and climbed into my room which I knew had an open port. The porthole was almost overhead and I climbed through it, slid down the side which inclined about 50 and jumped into the water. [Emphasis added.]

Ensign J. M. Doherty wrote:

When the word was passed to man battle stations I left the J.O. [Junior Officers] Mess for the third deck. On the way down the ladder, the first bomb or torpedo hit. Before I ever got to the Communications Office, oil was pouring into the compartment A-122-P from a hole near frame 60. We had no time to set Zed ["Zed" or "Condition Zed" refers to the closure of all watertight hatches and doors] and I guess there were four or five hits in about five minutes. The ship listed to port and oil was knee deep on the third deck after the first five to seven minutes. [Emphasis added.]

Shipfitter, First Class, W. T. Link wrote:

Time was short and in such time word was passed, "Japanese Airplane Attack--All unengaged personnel seek cover on the third deck--Set condition Zed--Man your Battle Stations."

By sending the men to seek cover on the third deck, jammed ladders prevented quick access to repair stations and also crowded repair stations. ...

I never did hear "Abandon ship" and Repair One did not all escape... [Emphasis added.]

Perhaps the most brutal account concerned the loss of more than a quarter of the men lost with *Oklahoma*. Chief Machinist I. M. Hull wrote about 125 men remained in an air pocket in the shipfitters shop, but when the space was opened, water rushed in as air rushed out. Only one man of this group saved himself by swimming to the CPO [Chief Petty Officer] pantry on the third deck and out through an open porthole.

The lights were out. ... The ship had listed 90 to port so I tried to swim out through the same hatch but was washed back again and landed in the C100s along the Conveyor. I dogged the door down to the shipfitter shop. The ship listed another 90 thus being all the way over. We had about 125 men in the C100s. After 4 hours, the men tore the door off the shipfitter shop. Water and oil came into the C100s and rose to waist level. I swam to the CPO pantry and out a port hole. None came with me. I left the ship about 1300, 5 hours after the ship sank.²⁸ [Emphasis added.]

Crewmen were trapped within the capsized hull, some survived for days within air pockets. Julio DeCastro, a Hawaiian civilian yard worker, organized a team that saved 32 *Oklahoma* sailors in the days immediately following.

Salvage and Wreck Removal

Wreck removal of *Oklahoma* commenced on 15 July 1942 under Captain F.H. Whitaker, U.S. Navy and a team from the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard. In 1943 she was righted. Unlike the other battleships - except *Arizona* - that were salvaged following Pearl Harbor, *Oklahoma* was too heavily damaged to be returned to service. She was decommissioned and stricken on 1 September 1944, a year and a day before the surrender of Japan. Eventually she was stripped of all remaining armaments and superstructure before being sold for scrap in 1946. The hulk sank in a storm while being towed from Oahu to a breakers yard in San Francisco Bay on 17 May 1947.²⁹ *Oklahoma* received a single battle star.



Fig. 22: Salvage operations on Oklahoma. The attack killed 429 Qmcj qo c crewmen.



Fig. 23: Aloysius Schmitt, the chaplain, helped other sailors escape the sinking ship through port holes. (The Washington Post) ²⁸ Both images from Dependent web site³⁰



Fig. 24: A commemorative cover for the refloating of Oklahoma with Locy Type 2z cancel, a mute mark from Fleet Air Base, Hawaii, and a censor marking. The cover is autographed by USS Utah's final commanding officer, Rear Admiral Solomon Silas "Little Izzy" Isquith, U.S. Navy, who received the Navy Cross for his heroism on 7 December 1941 and subsequently commanded the salvage force at Pearl Harbor.

Memorial and Reinternment

In 2003, a part of the fire control tower support mast from *Oklahoma* was recovered from the bottom of Pearl Harbor. In 2007, it was delivered to the Muskogee War Memorial Park where the 45 foot long, 22,000 pound, barnacle-encrusted mast section is now on permanent display. On 7 December 2007, the 66th anniversary of the attack on Pearl Harbor, a memorial for the men killed in the attack was dedicated on Ford Island.

Only 35 of the 429 sailors and Marines who died with *Oklahoma* were identified in the years following the attack. The remains of 388 unidentified sailors and Marines were first interred as unknowns in the Nu'uanu and Halawa cemeteries, but were all disinterred in 1947 in an unsuccessful attempt to identify more personnel. In 1950, all unidentified remains from *Oklahoma* were reburied in 61 caskets in 45 graves at the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific in Honolulu.

In April 2015, the Department of Defense announced that the remains of unidentified *Oklahoma* crewmen would be exhumed with the goal of returning identified remains to their families. The process began in June 2015 – using dental and medical records and gathering DNA samples from the crew's relatives. Some 61 rusty coffins from 45 graves were found each to contain several bundles of bones, often mixed up. A recent *Washington Post* article explained:

Their bones are brown with age after 50 years in the ground and, before that, months entombed in their sunken battleship beneath the oily waters of Pearl Harbor. Legs, arms, ribs, vertebrae. Some have blue tags tied with string, identifying the type of bone. Some have beige tags, indicating that experts also want samples for DNA testing."...

FIRST WARSHIP SUNK 7 DEC 1941: USS OKLAHOMA ~ Capt. Lawrence B. Brennan, (Ret.)

In the immediate aftermath of Pearl Harbor, the handling of the crew's remains suffered error, confusion and poor record keeping. Most were retrieved during the long salvage operation, especially after the Oklahoma was righted in 1943, but the bodies had been reduced to skeletons. By 1944, the jumbled remains, still saturated with fuel oil, had been buried as unknowns in Hawaii. ...

Father Schmitt's corroded chalice and water-stained Latin prayer book were found in the wreckage...

[Now] the bones have been exhumed from a cemetery in Hawaii to be brought to a new laboratory in Nebraska for scientists to begin the task. The goal is to send the remains of those who died back home. "It's important for the families," said Carrie Brown, an anthropologist with a newly created agency, the DPAA [Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency], which is responsible for accounting for those captured, killed or missing in action.

Debra Prince Zinni, a forensic anthropologist involved in the project, said they now had the techniques needed to carry out the project, but admitted it would take years to complete... ⁵³

In January 2016, the Department of Defense "announced positive identification of five USS *Oklahoma* sailors: ... Petty Officer 1st Class Vernon T. Luke, 43, of Green Bay, Wisc., Chief Petty Officer Duff Gordon, 52, of Hudson, Wisc., Chief Petty Officer Albert E. Hayden, 44, of Mechanicsville, Md.; Ensign Lewis S. Stockdale, 27, of Anaconda, Mont.; and Seaman 2nd Class Dale F. Pearce, 21, of Labette County, Kan.³²

Avoidable Fatalities

While neither loss nor casualties could have been avoided, the excessive number of deaths could have been reduced by strict adherence to sound policies and practices. The casualty lists were expanded because of the failure to perceive the risks of combat (an all too frequent lack of situational awareness) when the warning signs were obvious.

War warnings³³ preceded the loss of *Oklahoma* by more than a week but inexplicably she was scheduled for a routine inspection on Monday, 8 December 1941. As a result the ship's bilges had been opened and the flooding caused by multiple torpedo hits on the port side caused *Oklahoma* to capsize rapidly, trapping many sailors as she quickly capsized. It is questionable if *Oklahoma* could have been "buttoned up" on the morning of 7 December or if counter-flooding could have been successful in the 12 minutes between General Quarters and capsizing but there was no realistic chance of remaining afloat in the condition in which she found herself, open internally and heavily damaged on the port side by multiple torpedo hits. The same is true for the demilitarized *Utah*. Captain Bode's 20 December 1941 report described his ship's material condition.³⁴

10. Condition Zed was being set. Ship, third deck and below was practically in condition Yoke, at the beginning of the attack. Not possible to determine exact degree of closure under present conditions. Situation (rapid flooding) did not permit of correcting heel or trim or other measures listed.³⁵

NJPH 18 Vol. 44/No. 1 Feb 2016 Whole No. 201 These unseaworthy and "unbattleworthy" conditions existed not only in *Oklahoma*. Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, U.S. Naval Reserve (Ret.), normally cautious in criticism of warriors, wrote:

California, flagship of Vice Admiral W. S. Pye ...although the last of the battleships to be hit...was less prepared than any for the blows. Her material condition as to watertight integrity was bad; [fn. 48] It is a well-known fact, although never publicly admitted, that battleships carrying admirals' flags, although taut and smart in appearance, were commonly inferior to others in readiness and material condition because (1) of the practice of 'marking them up'-that is, overlooking shortcomings at material inspections in order not to mortify or annoy the admiral; and because (2) admirals and their staffs demanded lots of "spit and polish," turning out cocktail tables and the like, which took men from important tasks. In the case of California, a material inspection was about to be made, which may explain but cannot excuse the fact, admitted by the commanding officer, that six manhole covers to the double bottoms were off, and the securing nuts of 12 others were slacked away. [Citations omitted.] Too many of her officers were ashore; and some of those on board failed to act quickly or intelligently. There was a delay in sounding General Quarters and ordering Condition Zed set.³⁶

Driving home the lack of foresight and critical thinking which permeated the CINCUS staff, Morison further quoted the Commanding Officer's Report of 26 January 1942 that California's "progressive flooding was caused by a combination of battle damage, non-closure of watertight fittings, and rupture of ventilation ducts." [Emphasis added.]³⁷ The loss of major ships due to refusal to counter-flood continued into 1942. On 9 February 1942, USS Lafavette (ex SS Normandie) suffered a fire while being converted to a high speed troop transport in New York Harbor. The ship's fire-fighting system had been disconnected. The New York Fire Department pumped thousands of tons of water to douse the fires above *Lafayette*'s main deck. The ship developed a list to port. Vice Admiral Adolphus A. Andrews, U.S. Navy, Commander, Eastern Sea Frontier as well as Commandant, Third Naval District, rejected recommendations by many including the ship's designer Vladimir Yourkevitch, to counter-flood. Lafayette lost stability and capsized at her berth on the Hudson (North) River. Between 17:45 and 18:00 on 9 February 1942, authorities considered the fire under control, and began winding down operations until 20:00. Water entering the ship through submerged openings and flowing to the lower decks negated efforts to counter-flood, and Lafayette's list gradually increased to port. Shortly after midnight, Admiral Andrews ordered Lafayette abandoned, and the ship continued to list, a process hastened by the 6,000 tons of water that had been played on her. Lafavette eventually capsized during the mid-watch (0245) on 10 February, and came to rest on her port side at an angle of approximately 80 degrees.³⁸

A generation later, Navy nearly lost a super-carrier under construction at the New York Naval Ship Yard in Brooklyn. Fifty yard workers were killed and more than 330 injured when on 19 December 1960, a fire erupted on board the nearly completed *Constellation* (CVA 64) which was fitting out. The New York City Fire Department extinguished the fires over 17 hours. The hull did not capsize because, in part, there was counter flooding to keep her stable.³⁹

The failure to prepare the capital ships of the U.S. Fleet for combat in view of the war warnings demonstrates an unfathomable degree of lack of situational awareness and near total absence of a warrior's ethos and the recognition of the risk of battle.

FIRST WARSHIP SUNK 7 DEC 1941: USS OKLAHOMA ~ Capt. Lawrence B. Brennan, (Ret.)

By contrast, the following Rule of Engagement was promulgated on board USS *Enterprise* (CV 6), at the same time while she was delivering aircraft to Wake Island:

U.S.S. ENTERPRISE

At Sea, November 28, 1941

BATTLE ORDER NUMBER ONE

- 1. The ENTERPRISE is now operating under war conditions.
- 2. At any time, day or night, we must be ready for instant action.
- 3. Hostile submarines may be encountered.
- 4. The importance of every officer and man being specially alert and vigilant while on watch at his battle station must be fully realized by all hands.
- 5. The failure of one man to carry out his assigned task promptly, particularly the lookouts, those manning the batteries, and all those on watch on the deck, might result in great loss of life and even loss of the ship.
- 6. The Captain is confident all hands will prove equal to any emergency that may develop.
- 7. It is part of the tradition of our Navy that, when put to the test, all hands keep cool, keep their heads, and FIGHT.
- 8. Steady nerves and stout hearts are needed now.

G. D. MURRAY, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding

Approved: November 28, 1941. W. F. HALSEY Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, Commander Aircraft, Battle Force⁴⁰

Oklahoma and Indianapolis would doubtless have suffered far fewer losses if these guidelines had been followed.



Illustration from the National Postal Museum

Fig. 25: Oklahoma on its side, after 7 December 1941.

Remaining Artifacts

The National Postal Museum at the Smithsonian houses some remarkable artifacts from Oklahoma, relating to the attack on Pearl:



Fig. 26: A registered handstamp for Oklahoma, bearing the Dec. 6, 1941 date.




Fig. 27: A strike from this handstamp (Locy Type 9v) autographed by Ensign Herbert F. Rommel, USNR.

"I am well" cards were issued to sailors after the bombing at Pearl, so sailors could let their families know they were OK. An example is shown in *Figure 28*.



Fig. 28: A regulation post card issued to survivors at Pearl to advise their families of their condition. The card, with a Locy Type 3z cancel, was sent by Musician First Class Charles Ralph Schaid, Jr.(1915-2003) who was member of Oklahoma's band. He served in the Navy between 1936 and 1946.. N.B. This card was sent at the one cent rate, prior to "Free Mail". 41

ENDNOTES:

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² Captain Herbert Fox Rommel, Jr., U.S. Navy (1915-2007) commanded five commissioned ships and the Washington Navy Yard. He enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserve and then was commissioned and called to active duty in 1939. He was a Turret Captain in *Oklahoma*. After *Oklahoma*, he was transferred to USS *Gridley* (DD 380) where he served for nearly three years ultimately as the ship's Executive Officer, ending the war as a Lieutenant Commander in command of the destroyer, USS *Wilkes* (DD 441).

³ There are two action reports submitted by the Commanding Officer, Captain Howard D. Bode, U.S. Navy. The reports are dated 18 December 1941. http://www.wwiiarchives.net/servlet/action/doc/Ar bb37 12181941 and 20 December 1941 http://www.wwiiarchives.net/servlet/action/doc/Ar bb37 12201941.

⁴ Laid down on 31 March1930, USS *Indianapolis* (CA35) was the second of two *Portland*-class cruisers. Built at the New York Shipbuilding Company, *Indianapolis* was launched on 7 November 1931. Commissioned at the Philadelphia Navy Yard the following November. *Indianapolis* fought throughout the war in the Pacific suffering damage from a kamikaze. She returned to the West Coast in 1945 and in that summer she sailed alone to deliver critical parts of the first nuclear weapon to Tinian. Around 0015 on 30 July, *I-58* hit *Indianapolis* with two torpedoes on her starboard bow and amidship. Fatally damaged, the cruiser continued ahead but sank in 12 minutes. Of the approximately 880 men who went into the water, fewer than 320 were rescued with four of those later dying from their wounds.

⁵ Charles B. McVay, Jr. was an admiral in the United States Navy who had more than 40 years of commissioned service (1890-1932). McVay was born on 9 September 1868 in Edgeworth, Pennsylvania. He was an 1890 graduate of the United States Naval Academy. During the Spanish–American War (1898), Ensign McVay served on board USS *Amphitrite* (BM-2), a double-turret monitor which patrolled the waters off Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Key West and participated in the shelling of San Juan in May 1898. In 1908, after serving as a navigator in USS *Hartford* and USS *Alabama* and a tour at the U.S. Naval Academy, McVay was given command of USS *Yankton*. During World War I, McVay commanded three vessels, an armored cruiser and two battleships: USS *Saratoga*, (ACR 2), USS *New Jersey* (BB 16), and USS *Oklahoma*. After the war, McVay served as a commander in the Yangtze Patrol. In 1929, he was promoted to Admiral and commanded the U.S. Asiatic Fleet. He retired in October 1932 and died on 28 October 1949.

⁶ Dictionary of American Fighting Ships online at http://www.hazegray.org/danfs/battlesh/bb31.htm .

⁷ Cutler, Thomas, "Lest We Forget" *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, June 2004, Vol. 130/6 1,216. http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2004-06/lest-we-forget-peter-tomich-uss-toledo-ca-133 Chief Tomich was honored by the destroyer escort USS *Tomich* (DE 242).

⁸ This article deals with the history of USS *Oklahoma* and the events immediately surrounding her loss. It is beyond the scope of this piece to address the strategic and tactical events which contributed to the success of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, such as the failure of Navy leadership in Washington to immediately communicate the scheduled delivery of a message to the Secretary of State by the Japanese ambassador at midday along with the destruction of equipment at the Japanese embassy (obtained as a result of breaking Japanese code), the U.S. Army radar observers' failure to recognize the Japanese in-bound strike on Oahu, the failure of U.S. Army Air Corps to conduct proper patrols to search for Japanese ships and aircraft, and the failure of local naval commanders at Pearl Harbor to report the early morning attack on Japanese "midget submarines" at the entrance to Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 by USS *Ward* (DD 139).

⁹ This article reproduces information from Wikipedia at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS Oklahoma %28BB-37%29, which in turn depends heavily on information on the DANFS (Dictionary of American Fighting Ships) site at http://web.archive.org/web/20070911120713/http://www.history.navy.mil/danfs/o2/oklahoma.htm. As DANFS is a work of the U.S. government, its content is in the public domain, and the text is often quoted verbatim in other works (including in some cases Wikipedia articles). Many websites organized by former and active crew members of U.S. Navy vessels include a copy of their ships' DANFS entries.

¹⁰ A Library of Congress Photo (http://loc.gov/pictures/resource/ggbain.15699/), reproduced on Wikipedia at https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/15/Oklahoma_BB37_5126122996_044c2569b0_o.jpg.

¹¹ Roger Welles (1862–1932) was a U. S. naval officer, the first commanding officer of *Oklahoma* and appointed the first "Navy Mayor" of San Diego. Welles gave 33 years of service in a variety of billets, eventually being promoted to Rear-Admiral. As an ensign he was engaged in surveys in Alaska, where he made a study of native people culture and language in his spare time. He served two years in the post of Special Counsel to the World's

NJPH 22 Vol. 44/No. 1 Feb 2016 Whole No. 201 Columbian Exposition in Chicago, and was awarded by its board for research on Orinoco River Indians. A former commander of the Naval Training Center in Newport, his command of *Oklahoma* was a short period of time mainly involving the command as a training ship. This was because the oil-fired boilers that she used were not able to be fueled in England, as German U-boats had drained their supply. After he turned over command to Rear Admiral Spencer K. Wood he was appointed Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence (April 1917–January 1919). Welles married Harriet Deen Gardner on 17 October 1908, who followed her husband's ship to Asia and later published accounts of journeys in *Scribner's Magazine* and the popular book *Anchors Aweigh*. He was entered on the Navy's Retired List on 7 December 1926, at the age of 64; he died in New York on 26 April 1932

- ¹² From Arlington National Cemetery web site at http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/cbmcvayjr.htm.
- ¹³ A Wikipedia photo at https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:USS Oklahoma BB-37.jpg.
- This scan by Jon Burdett, in the Naval Cover Museum at http://www.navalcovermuseum.org/wiki/images/7/70/JonBurdett_oklahoma_bb37_19210103.jpg.
- ¹⁵ Simpson, Michael (2004). *A life of Admiral of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham. A Twentieth-century Naval Leader*. Routledge Ed., p. 74. ISBN 978-0-7146-5197-2.
- ¹⁶ Official U.S. Navy photograph 80-G-387565.
- ¹⁷ She was sunk on 7 December 1944 by a kamikaze.
- ¹⁸ Morison, Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot, *History of United States Naval Operations In World War II, Volume III, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942* (Boston: 1948 Little, Brown & Co.) pp. 95-98.
- ¹⁹ The Horse's Mouth at http://horsesmouth.typepad.com/hm/2009/12/december-7-1941.html.
- ²⁰ Original diagram from http://navsource.org/archives/01/037/013719a.jpg.
- ²¹ Oklahoma History at http://www.okhistory.org/kids/usshistory2.
- http://web.mst.edu/~rogersda/umrcourses/ge342/Salvage%20of%20USS%20Oklahoma.pdf. It was incredible after the War Warning of November 1941 to schedule a routine inspection of *Oklahoma*, or any other combatant vessel. But that was precisely what was ordered by Vice Admiral William S. Pye, U.S. Navy, Commander, Battle Force, United States Fleet. Interestingly, Admiral Pye was Acting Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet between the relief of Admiral Kimmel and the arrival of Admiral Nimitz for less than two weeks 18-31 December 1941. His most memorable act was to recall the relief force sent to relieve Wake Island. Subsequently, Admiral Pye became Commander, Task Force ONE consisting of the remaining battleships in the Pacific Ocean which were based on the West Coast. He was relieved in October 1942 and the following month he became President, Naval War College, continuing on the retired list and served until after the Japanese surrender when he was relieved by Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, U.S. Navy.
- ²³ Photo from http://uboat.net/allies/commanders/4343.html.
- ²⁴ Wikipedia article using Nara photo 295984 at https://catalog.archives.gov/id/295984.
- http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/12/07/national/japanese-pearl-harbor-attack-map-fetches-425000-at-u-s-auction/#.VmWrleOFOpp.
- Naval History & Command web site at http://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/p/pearl-harbor-survivor-reports/uss-oklahoma-reports-survivor-pearl-harbor.html.
- http://www.history.navy.mil/research/archives/digitized-collections/action-reports/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack/ships-m-r/uss-oklahoma-bb-37-action-report-07-dec-1941.html.
- 28 http://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/p/pearl-harbor-survivor-reports/uss-oklahoma-reports-survivor-pearl-harbor.html.
- ²⁹ Oklahoma History at http://www.okhistory.org/kids/usshistory2.
- 30 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/uss-oklahoma-the-first-us-victims-of-the-second-world-war-are-finally-coming-home-a6771916.html.
- ³¹ "USS Oklahoma: The first US victims of the Second World War are finally coming home", *Washington Post* http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/uss-oklahoma-the-first-us-victims-of-the-second-world-war-are-finally-coming-home-a6771916.html.
- http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/two-state-sailers-who-died-on-uss-oklahoma-identified-b99656307z1-366110821.html.
- 33 http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/EastWind/CNO-411127.html.

4 November 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval Operations

ACTION: CinCAF, CinCPAC, Com 11, Com 12, Com 13, Com 15

INFO: Spenavo London Cinclant

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242005

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in **our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility.** Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action adees [addressees] to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.

28 November 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval Operations ACTION: Com Pnncf, Com Psncf

INFO: Cincpac Com Pncf

Refer to my 272338. Army has sent following to commander western defense command.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot repeat not be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measure should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. A separate message in being sent to G-2, Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in the United States. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. Unquote. WPL 52 is not applicable to Pacific area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in southeast Pacific sub area and Panama naval coastal frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL-46, so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur. [Emphasis added.]

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/EastWind/CNO-411127.html http://www.cv6.org/1941/btlord1/btlord1.html.

- Since *Oklahoma* "was practically in condition YOKE," it is clear that Condition YOKE had not been set. Rather, she remained in the lower state of readiness, Condition XRAY which provided the least watertight integrity and the greatest ease of access throughout the ship. It is set when the threat to the ship is minimal. Condition XRAY is set during working hours when the ship is in port and there is no danger of attack or from weather. The minimum degree of tightness permitted on an operational ship is condition XRAY. When condition XRAY is set, all fittings marked with a black X are closed. http://www.usshancockev19.com/navalmaterialconditions.html.
- 35 http://www.history.navy.mil/research/archives/digitized-collections/action-reports/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack/ships-m-r/uss-oklahoma-bb-37-action-report-07-dec-1941.html.
- ³⁶ Morison, Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot, *History of United States Naval Operations In World War II, Volume III, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942* (Boston: 1948 Little, Brown & Co.) pp. 111-12.
- ³⁷ Morison, Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot, *History of United States Naval Operations In World War II, Volume III, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942* (Boston: 1948 Little, Brown & Co.) p. 113. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/PTO/EastWind/CNO-411127.html.
- ³⁸ Ardman, Harvey, *Normandie: Her Life & Times*, Franklin Watts, 1985; Maxtone-Graham, *The Only Way to Cross*. New York: Collier Books, 1972; www.supsalv.org/SalvReports/USS%20Lafayette%20Salvage.pdf.
- ³⁹ <u>USS CONSTELLATION (CVA 64) FIRE http://bldg92.org/blog/USS Constellation Fire/N.Y. / Region | NYC; Haberman, Clyde, "Recalling a Brooklyn Disaster Otherwise Forgotten", New York *Times*, December 20, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/21/nyregion/21nyc.html? r=0.</u>
- 40 http://www.cv6.org/1941/btlord1/btlord1.html.
- ⁴¹ From the U.S. Militaria Form blogsite at http://www.usmilitariaforum.com/forums/index.php?/topic/168850-1941-pearl-harbor-postal-history-post-yours/.